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POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND LEWIS V. HARRIS: A MATTER OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
I. INTRODUCTION
The fight for marriage equality in New Jersey and across the nation is intensifying and
well chronicled. In the wake of recent successes in Maine, Maryland and Washington, marriage
equality advocates in the Garden State are approaching their campaign with renewed fervor.1
This paper will discuss the status of the New Jersey campaign for marriage equality, highlighting
the history of the marriage equality debate in the state. The paper will focus on litigation,
legislation, and possible next steps for marriage equality activists, including: further legislation
or a legislative override; a public referendum to amend the New Jersey Constitution to provide
for same-sex marriage; or a victory for marriage equality in the courtroom. Further, it will pose
the question of whether the Supreme Court of New Jersey erred in failing to provide full
marriage equality in Lewis v. Harris2 or whether the current state of affairs on this issue is
inevitable given the political realities of the state.
Part II of this paper will survey the recent history of the New Jersey campaign for
marriage equality, both in the courts and in the legislative chambers as well as in the front office
of the Statehouse in Trenton, New Jersey. First, the New Jersey Supreme Court case of Lewis v.
Harris will be discussed, including a critical analysis of the majority opinion’s overly pragmatic
and deferential approach to the constitutional question of whether a denial of same-sex marriage
constitutes a due process or equal protection violation under the state constitution.3 Part II will
also focus on then-Chief Justice Poritz’s part concurrence, part dissent, which sternly criticized
the majority for abdicating its responsibility to adjudicate constitutional questions to the New

1

Julie Bolcer, Is New Jersey Next for a Marriage Referendum?, THE ADVOCATE (Nov. 8, 2012, 1:41 PM),
http://www.advocate.com/politics/marriage-equality/2012/11/08/new-jersey-next-marriage-referendum.
2
Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006).
3
Id.
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Jersey Legislature.4 The Part will conclude by surveying the various avenues through which
marriage equality advocates are fighting for full marriage equality in the state. The political
quagmire that the Lewis decision created will become evident in assessing the current status of
the campaign towards marriage equality.
Part III will provide a constitutional theoretical basis for analyzing the Lewis decision,
paying particular attention to the theory of popular constitutionalism, which advocates for
judicial deference to democratic processes.5

Under this theory, because of the differences

between state and the federal constitutions, specifically the penetrability of state constitutions,
non-judicial actors play a significant role in interpreting state constitutions. As evidenced in
Lewis, judicial deliberations and decision-making are influenced by the judiciary’s concern that
non-judicial actors will mobilize in order to “correct” judicial decisions. Part IV will examine
the Lewis decision under the lens of popular constitutionalism, ultimately concluding that Lewis
v. Harris was wrongly decided. The court’s pragmatic, minimalist approach in Lewis was overly
deferential to the democratically elected legislature. The majority craftily characterized the due
process issue of denying marriage equality and the question of “what is in a name” as questions
of policy rather than of constitutional principle in order to avoid answering a question regarding
a contentious social issue.
Finally, Part V will stress the importance of the court’s independent role in constitutional
adjudication. This role is even more critical when the court is charged with deciding claims
regarding the civil rights of minority groups. Yet courts are even more likely to minimize this

4

Id. at 230 (Poritz, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism: Toward a Theory of State Constitutional Meanings, 30 RUTGERS L.
J. 871, 875, 887 (1999).
5
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role in equal protection and due process cases involving the rights of insular minorities.6 The
tenets of popular constitutionalism challenge the role of the court as an independent branch,
serving to check the democratically-elected branches of government. Ultimately, the majority in
Lewis abdicated its role as the bulwark of the state constitution, capable of protecting oppressed
minorities against the power of the democratically elected branches of government and the
people

at

large.7

Whether

categorized

as

popular

constitutionalism,8

pragmatic

constitutionalism,9 or deferential minimalism,10 the concept that an independent judiciary should
head to the popular will is troubling because it is antithetical to the premise of American
government. Moving forward, if individuals, most significantly socially unpopular minority
groups, are to be fully protected by the courts, the judiciary must eschew the tenets of popular
constitutionalism and, instead, embrace its role as an independent branch of government.

II. THE HISTORY OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY IN NEW JERSEY: IN THE COURTS AND IN THE
LEGISLATURE
In order to understand the current standoff surrounding the campaign for marriage
equality in New Jersey, it is important to first survey the principal case of Lewis v. Harris.11 In
Lewis, the New Jersey Supreme Court declared that same-sex couples must, on state equal
protection grounds, be granted the same rights and benefits afforded to opposite-sex married
couples.12

Yet, the court left it to the New Jersey Legislature either to afford same-sex couples

6

Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social Change, and Fact-Based Adjudications,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1958 (2006).
7
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
8
See generally Reed, supra note 5.
9
See generally Jeffrey L. Amestoy, SIXTEENTH ANNUAL ISSUE ON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: FOREWORD: State
Constitutional Law Lecture: Pragmatic Constitutionalism -- Reflections on State Constitutional Theory and SameSex Marriage Claims, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1249, 1250 (2004).
10
See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (1996).
11
Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006).
12
Id.
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the right to marry or to set up a parallel structure with which to allocate the rights and benefits.13
While Justice Albin and the majority took a practical, deferential approach to the due process
question, Chief Justice Poritz argued for a constitutional purism approach.14 The majority’s
abdication of its responsibility to answer a critical constitutional question and guard the rights of
insular minorities against the politically powerful15 has led to a quagmire in which the political
realities that accompany a highly debated issue have led to standstill.
Notably, the remedy the New Jersey Supreme Court contrived was not new. In Baker v.
State, same-sex couples brought an action against the government seeking declaratory judgment
that the refusal to issue them marriage licenses violated marriage statutes and the Vermont State
Constitution.16 The Vermont Supreme Court, under then-Chief Justice Amestoy concluded that
excluding same-sex couples from the benefits and protections afforded opposite-sex married
couples violated the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution.17 Yet, the court
further found that whether these benefits and protections were to take the “form of inclusion
within the marriage laws themselves or a parallel ‘domestic partnership’ system or some
equivalent statutory alternative, rests with the Legislature.”18 State constitutional law scholar
Robert F. Williams described this move by noting that the court “remanded” the case to the
legislative branch with instructions to act,19 in precisely the same manner as the New Jersey
experience that will now be discussed below.
13

Upon “legislative remand,” the Vermont

Id.
Id. at 230 (Poritz, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
15
See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
16
744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999).
17
Id. Importantly, the New Jersey does not contain the same clause under which the Vermont decision was decided.
The Common Benefits Clause, the pertinent part of the Vermont Constitution, reads as follows: “That government
is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or community,
and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single person, family, or set of persons, who are a part
only of that community . . . .” VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 7.
18
Baker, 744 A.2d at 867.
19
Robert F. Williams, Old Constitutions and New Issues: National Lessons from Vermont's State Constitutional
Case on Marriage of Same-Sex Couples, 43 B.C. L. REV 73, 99 (2001).
14
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Legislature passed a civil union act. Yet, in 2009, after experiencing and assessing the failures
of civil unions, the state legislature amended the Vermont law so as to include same-sex couples
in marriage and to phase out civil union by 2011.20

If the Vermont experience is any indication,

advocates will be successful in achieving the legality of same-sex marriage in New Jersey, but
the precise method of success is unclear.
A. Marriage Equality Litigation: Lewis v. Harris
Lewis v. Harris involved seven same-sex couples-plaintiffs challenging New Jersey’s law
regarding civil marriage, which restricts civil marriage to heterosexual couples. After being
denied marriage licenses, the Lewis plaintiffs sought both a declaration that New Jersey law
violated liberty and equal protection guarantees and injunctive relief compelling defendants 21 to
grant plaintiffs marriage licenses.22 The state argued that same-sex marriage has “no historical
roots in the traditions or collective conscience of the people of New Jersey to give it the ranking
of a fundamental right” and that barring marriage to same-sex couples was a “rational exercise of
social policy by the legislature.”23

Therefore, the state maintained that any change to the

“bedrock principle” limiting marriage to heterosexual couples must come from the “democratic
process.”24

20

Marc R. Poirier, Lewis v. Harris II — “Civil Union” Versus “Marriage,” One More Time, CONCURRING
OPINIONS (Apr. 29, 2010, 2:15 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/04/lewis-v-harris-ii-civilunion-versus-marriage-one-more-time.html.
21
The defendants included Gwendolyn L. Harris, then Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Human
Services, responsible for implementing the state’s marriage statutes; Clifton R. Lacy, then Commissioner of the
then-New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services, responsible for operating the State Registrar of Vital
Statistics; and Joseph Komosinski, then acting State Registrar of Vital Statistics, responsible for supervising local
registration of marriage records. All defendants’ positions included responsibilities relating to issuing marriage
licenses. Id. at 202–03.
22
Id. at 202.
23
Id. at 205.
24
Id. at 206.
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The trial court granted summary judgment for the state, concluding that state laws
relating to marriage did not violate the New Jersey State Constitution.25 In so holding, the trial
court noted that the plaintiffs were not attempting to lift a barrier to marriage, but to “change its
very essence” and suggested the best avenue for accomplishing this endeavor was through the
legislature, not through the courts.26 A divided three-judge Appellate Division panel affirmed
the trial court’s decision.27 Basing the affirming decision on the text of the state constitution, the
state’s history and traditions, and contemporary and social standards, Judge Skillman held that
“[m]arriage between members of the same sex is clearly not a fundamental right.”28
Significantly, in his dissent, Judge Collester, who found same-sex marriage to be a fundamental
right, explained his disagreement with the majority’s perception of the court’s role in the case,
stating: “we must interpret our Constitution to uphold individual rights, liberties and guarantees
for all citizens even though our conclusion may disappoint or offend some earnest and thoughtful
citizens.”29 The New Jersey Supreme Court soon thereafter granted certiorari of the Appellate
Court decision as a matter of right.
On October 25, 2006, the Supreme Court of New Jersey issued its decision in the case,
considering whether, under the New Jersey Constitution, same-sex couples must be afforded the
right to marriage and its attendant social and financial benefits and privileges.30 The New Jersey
Supreme Court unanimously decided that same-sex couples are entitled to the same protections
as heterosexual couples under the New Jersey Constitution, but declined to find that the state

25

More specifically, the trial court granted summary judgment for the state and dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint,
concluding that marriage was restricted to a man and woman, that same-sex couples did not have a fundamental
right to marriage, and that state laws related to marriage did not violate the state constitution’s equal protection
guarantees. Id. at 203.
26
Id.
27
Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259 (App.Div.2005).
28
Id. at 268.
29
Id. at 278 (J. Collester, dissenting).
30
Lewis, 908 A.2d 196.
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Constitution required that marriage be specifically required to confer these protections and
benefits.31 In so deciding, the court expressly deferred to the New Jersey Legislature as to how
the attendant rights should be acknowledged in a statute.32 Two questions were before the court,
one based on due process rights and one on equal protection considerations:
In this case, we must decide whether persons of the same sex have
a fundamental right to marry that is encompassed within the
concept of liberty guaranteed by Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New
Jersey Constitution. Alternatively, we must decide whether Article
I, Paragraph 1's equal protection guarantee requires that committed
same-sex couples be given on equal terms the legal benefits and
privileges awarded to married heterosexual couples and, if so,
whether that guarantee also requires that the title of marriage, as
opposed to some other term, define the committed same-sex legal
relationship.33
1. The Majority’s Deferential Pragmatism
In holding that denying same-sex couples the rights and benefits statutorily afforded to
heterosexual couples violated the equal protection guarantee of Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New
Jersey Constitution, the majority based its conclusion on the State’s legislative and judicial
commitment to eradicating sexual orientation discrimination.34 Although finding that same-sex
couples are entitled to certain rights and benefits, the majority declined to recognize that samesex couples had a fundamental right to marriage.35
Following the general Fourteenth Amendment Due Process standard set forth by the
United States Supreme Court, the majority first addressed the due process claim. The majority
reasoned that fundamental rights are only those so “deeply rooted in the tradition, history, and

31

Id.
Id. at 222.
33
Id. at 200.
34
Id. The text of the constitutional provision in question provides: “All persons are by nature free and independent,
and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.” N.J. CONST.
art. I, ¶ 1.
35
Lewis, 908 A.2d at 200.
32
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conscience of the people” to be found to be fundamental.36 In defining the asserted liberty
interest in question, the court limited its review to same-sex marriage as a fundamental right, not
the “abstract” right to marriage.37 Despite the “rich diversity of the state, the tolerance and
goodness of its people, and many recent advances made by gays and lesbians toward achieving
social acceptance and equality under the law,” the majority did not find same-sex couple’s right
to marriage to be fundamental.38
The court then turned to the question of whether the state’s marriage laws offend the
equal protection principles of the state constitution. The majority rejected a so-called “all-ornothing” approach for conducting its equal protection analysis, reasoning that awarding the
rights attendant to marriage does not necessarily require that same-sex couples be granted the
right to marry.39

The court therefore divided the equal protection issue into two distinct

questions: “whether committed same-sex couples have a constitutional right to the benefits and
privileges afforded to married heterosexual couples, and, if so, whether they have the
constitutional right to have their ‘permanent committed relationship’ recognized by the name of
marriage.”40
Significantly, the majority recognized the unjustified dichotomy between the “seeming
ordinariness of the plaintiffs’ lives” and the “social indignities and economic difficulties” the
plaintiffs faced due to the “inferior legal standing” of same-sex couples under New Jersey law.41
The consequences of this unequal treatment included: the expensive and time-consuming process
36

Id. The test the court utilized, as set forth by the United States Supreme Court, involved a two-step inquiry. First,
“the asserted fundamental liberty interest must be clearly identified” and second, “that liberty interest must be
objectively and deeply rooted in the traditions, history, and conscience of the people” of New Jersey. Id. at 206–07
(citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965)).
37
Id. at 208. The court reasoned that: it is “concerned only with the question of whether the right to same-sex
marriage is deeply rooted in this State's history and its people's collective conscience.” Id.
38
Id. at 211.
39
Id. at 202, 206.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 202.
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of cross-adopting each other’s children; paying excessive health insurance premiums; not having
the right to “family leave;” adverse inheritance tax consequences; and denial of privileges
customarily extended to family members at medical facilities.42 Noting that the judiciary and
legislature have acted progressively to provide committed same-sex couples a “strong interest in
equality of treatment relative to comparable heterosexual couples,” the majority concluded that
denying homosexual couples the rights and benefits afforded to heterosexual married couples
violated the equal protection guarantee embedded in the New Jersey Constitution.43
The court then turned to the question of whether same-sex couples must be afforded the
right to marriage itself.44 Rather than find that same-sex marriage must be legalized in order for
marriage laws to be in compliance with the state constitutional mandate of equal protection, the
majority took a more cautious approach by deferring to the New Jersey Legislature. The court
required that the legislature either “amend the marriage statutes to include same-sex couples or
create a parallel statutory structure” that would provide the “rights and benefits enjoyed and
burdens and obligations borne by married couples.”45 The majority explicitly stated that the
proper statutory scheme to define same-sex couples, be it marriage or otherwise, was a question
to be left to the “democratic process.”46 The majority further noted that if the legislature created
a “parallel statutory structure” that did not include the title of marriage, the court would not
presume that such a structure contravenes equal protection principles so long as the parallel
structure provided the rights and benefits of marriage available to same-sex couples.47 In short,
while finding an equal protection violation, the majority failed to find a constitutional right to

42

Id.
Id. at 215.
44
Id. at 206.
45
Id. at 200.
46
Id.
47
Id.
43
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marriage equality, instead leaving it to non-judicial, democratically-elected actors to determine
the future of same-sex marriage in the state.
2. The Poritz Dissent: A Constitutional, Not a Political Question
Then-Chief Justice Poritz, joined by Justices Zazzali and Long, concurred with the
majority that denying the rights and benefits to same-sex couples statutorily afforded to
heterosexual couples violated the equal protection guarantee of the state constitution.48 On the
fundamental rights claim, Poritz found no “principled basis” to distinguish between the rights
and benefits flowing from the right to the title of marriage, dissenting both from the majority’s
bifurcation of the equal protection argument and from the majority’s finding that there was no
fundamental right to same-sex marriage encompassed within the New Jersey State Constitution’s
concept of ordered liberty.49
Chief Justice Poritz took particular issue with the majority’s narrow framing of the
constitutional questions presented. Criticizing the majority’s characterization of the asserted
liberty right as limited to same-sex marriage, the Chief Justice noted that the majority avoided
the “more difficult questions of personal dignity and autonomy” raised by the Lewis plaintiffs.
Poritz reasoned that the majority’s framing of the due process question as whether there is a
fundamental right to same-sex marriage deeply rooted in the tradition of the state as suggesting
the answer—“no.”50

The Chief Justice found the majority’s logic troubling and viciously

circular: because the right has been historically denied to those who now tried to exercise it, it
cannot be fundamental.51 Conversely, had the majority asked the broader question of whether

48

Id. at 224 (Portiz, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
Id.
50
Id. at 227.
51
See id. at 227–28.
49
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the right to marriage is so deeply embedded in tradition as to be ranked fundamental, the answer
would be a resounding “yes.”52
Further, Poritz objected to the majority’s due process analysis, noting that, as the
Supreme Court of the United States established in Loving v. Virginia,53 a right can be deemed
fundamental even if it is not found in the “historical traditions and conscience of the people.”54
Again criticizing the majority’s overly narrow analytical framework, Poritz noted that in Loving,
the Court did not inquire whether interracial marriage was deeply rooted in Virginia’s traditions,
but simply whether the plaintiffs had a right to marry, even though they had traditionally been
denied such a right.55 Highlighting the lessons of Loving, Chief Justice Poritz concluded that:
Loving teaches that the fundamental right to marry no more
can be limited to same-race couples than it can be limited
to those who choose a committed relationship with persons
of the opposite sex. By imposing that limitation on samesex couples, the majority denies them access to one of our
most cherished institutions simply because they are
homosexuals.56
In Poritz’s view, the majority entirely failed to address the precise relief sought by the
plaintiffs: inclusion and participation in the institution of marriage.57 While the benefits and
52

Id. at 228 (citing J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (2001); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)) (noting that the right to marry is fundamental and
protected by both state and federal constitutions).
53
Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
54
Lewis, 908 A.2d at 228 (Portiz, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (citing id.).
55
Id. To be sure, it is important to note that the Supreme Court has developed substantive due process under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments significantly since 1967.
56
Id.
57
The dissent noted the plaintiffs’ focus on the significance of the right to marry itself. As though responding to the
question of “what’s in a name,” the plaintiffs explained: “When I am asked about my relationship, I want my words
to match my life, so I want to say I am married and know that my relationship with Alicia is immediately
understood, and after that nothing more needs be explained;” and:
When you say that you are married, others know immediately that you have
taken steps to create something special . . . . The word ‘married’ gives you
automatic membership in a vast club of people whose values are clarified by
their choice of marriage. With a marriage, everyone can instantly relate to you
and your relationship. They don't have to wonder what kind of relationship it is
or how to refer to it or how much to respect it.
Id. at 226.
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rights attendant to marriage were important to the plaintiffs, Poritz’s dissent focused on the
“deep and symbolic significance” of the institution of marriage and the power of language and
labels to perpetuate prejudice about differences.58 As a result, Chief Justice Poritz argued that
“[t]he question of access to civil marriage by same-sex couples ‘is not a matter of social policy
but [one] of constitutional interpretation’” best addressed by the courts of law, rather than the
legislature.59
B. Marriage Inequality in New Jersey: The Failure of Civil Unions in the Wake of Lewis v.
Harris
As discussed above, in the Lewis decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court directed the
New Jersey Legislature either to grant same-sex couples the right to marriage or to create a
parallel statutory structure” that would provide the “rights and benefits enjoyed and burdens and
obligations borne by married couples.”60 The legislature was given a deadline of 180 days to
correct the violation.61 The New Jersey Legislature, taking its cue from the majority in Lewis,

58

Id. at 224, 226.
Id. at 231 (quoting Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 569
(Mass. 2004)). Massachusetts is one of only a few states that have a provision in its constitution permitting or
requiring its state supreme court to give an advisory opinion to the governor or legislature. MASS. CONST. ch. 3, art.
II (“Each branch of the legislature, as well as the governor and council, shall have authority to require the opinions
of the justices of the supreme judicial court, upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions.”). In
fact, Massachusetts’ advisory opinion clause is the oldest in the nation. M.A. Topf, The Jurisprudence of the
Advisory Opinion Process in Rhode Island, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 207, 214. Upon request, in February
2004, the justices of the Massachusetts Supreme Court issued their opinion regarding the constitutionality of the
Massachusetts Senate’s bill Senate, No. 2175, which would have provided for civil unions for same-sex couples
while statutorily prohibiting same-sex couples for entering into marriage. Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802
N.E.2d 565, 568. The bill would provide the legal protections, benefits, and rights and responsibilities associated
with civil marriage while precluding inclusion in the traditional institution of marriage. Id. The majority opinion
concluded that the proposed legislation would violate the equal protection and due process requirements of the state
constitution and that the violating provisions were inseverable from the remainder of the bill. Id. at 572. The
Massachusetts’ legislature’s use of the advisory opinion clause in order to avoid adoption an unconstitutional act
exemplifies a successful dialog between the branches of government in order to protect individuals’ rights.
60
Lewis, 908 A.2d at 200. Importantly, as noted above, this is the same remedy that the Vermont Supreme Court
crafted in Baker v. State. 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999).
61
Lewis, 908 A.2d at 200.
59
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quickly passed the Civil Union Act in December 2006 in order to comply with the equal
treatment mandate required by the opinion.62
But the New Jersey Legislature also created the Civil Union Review Commission (the
“Commission”) as part of the Civil Union Act.63 The Commission was tasked with reviewing all
aspects of the Civil Union Act and was to report its findings and recommendations semi-annually
to the New Jersey Legislature and Governor.64 The Commission was to expire three years after
its creation, effective February 19, 2007, and was to issue a final report upon its expiration.65
The Commission held public hearings during which many civilly unionized couples
testified, explaining their experiences in the wake of the Civil Union Act and the failings of the
civil union system.

During a September 2007 hearing before the Civil Union Review

Commission panel, hundreds of civilly unionized couples gathered to voice their displeasure
over the failures of the civil union structure.66 After several hearings and considerable factfinding, the Commission’s final seventy-nine-page report concluded that the civil union structure

62

2006 N.J. Laws 103.
Id.
64
Specifically, the duties of the Commission included:
evaluating the implementation, operation and effectiveness of the act;
collecting information about the act’s effectiveness from members of
the public, State agencies and private and public sector businesses and
organizations; determining whether additional protections are needed;
collecting information about the recognition and treatment of civil
unions by other states and jurisdictions including the procedures for
dissolution; evaluating the effect on same-sex couples, their children
and other family members of being provided civil unions rather than
marriage; and evaluating the financial impact on the State of New
Jersey of same-sex couples being provided civil unions rather than
marriage.
Civil Union Review Commission, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY,
http://www.nj.gov/oag/dcr/curc.html.
65
N.J. STAT. § 37:1-36 (2007).
66
Angela Delli Santi, NJ Civil Unions Fall Short, Panel Told, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/26/AR2007042601005.html.
63
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did not provide full equality to same-sex couples and recommended that the state adopt same-sex
marriage.67
In short, the Commission concluded that a civil union does not equal a marriage. Citing
to “overwhelming evidence,” the Commission concluded that, not only did the Civil Union Act
fail to provide adequate protections to same-sex couples, as required under Lewis, but it also
posed economic, medical, and emotional hardships for same-sex couples.68 Another major issue
that the Commission discussed in its report, which was raised by many same-sex couples at the
various public hearings, is that some employers and hospitals do not recognize the rights and
benefits of marriage for civil unionized couples.69 Therefore, employers deny equal health
benefits to partners of employees and partners are unable to make important medical decisions
and to visit partners in the hospital.
The failures of the Civil Union Act are not limited to the denial of benefits, but are
inherent in the separate, “parallel” structure itself. The Commission noted that even if, “given
enough time, civil unions are understood to provide rights and responsibilities equivalent to those
provided in marriage,” the separate status of a civil union sends a message to the public that
same-sex couples are not equal to opposite-sex couples under the law.70 While deferring to the
legislature in Lewis, the majority nonetheless recognized the plight of same-sex couples: “the
title of marriage is an intangible right, without which they are consigned to second-class

67

New Jersey Civil Union Review Commission, The Legal, Medical, Economic & Social Consequences of New
Jersey's Civil Union Law 2, Dec. 10, 2008, available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/dcr/downloads/CURC-Final-Report.pdf [hereinafter Final Report].
68
Susan K. Livio, Commission Says New Jersey Should Allow Gay Marriage, NJ.COM (Dec. 10, 2008),
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2008/12/goldstein.html.
69
Final Report, supra note 67, at 1.
70
Id. at 2.
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citizenship.”71

This observation no doubt has proven accurate in light of New Jersey’s

experience with the parallel statutory structure of civil unions.
Many scholars have noted that a primary concern related to the separate institution of
civil unions for same-sex couples is the stigma that comes along with the separate label. A civil
union is not a marriage. As Martha Minow explains: “Human beings use labels to describe and
sort their perceptions of the world. The particular labels often chosen in American culture can
carry social and moral consequences while burying the choices and responsibility for those
consequences.”72 Given the weight Americans give to labels in order to assess the world around
them, “language and labels play a special role in the perpetuation of prejudice about
differences.”73
Scholars have addressed the question that the New Jersey Supreme Court struggled with
in Lewis: what is in a name? As Professor Marc Poirier has described, “the availability of two
different names will tend to force anyone involved in identifying or even thinking about a couple
or family relationship to perform the distinction between same-sex and different-sex couples.”74
As Professor Poirier reasons, although the state may proclaim that civil unions are to be deemed
the equivalent of marriage, such a “disclaimer is ineffective,” as the legal distinction reinforces
the everyday practices of categorization, including those practices that are harmful and plausibly
unconstitutional.75
Until there is but one name to describe a couple who choose to share their lives together
under the law, same-sex couples will not achieve full equality with their opposite-sex
71

Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 221 (N.J. 2006). Interestingly, the court concluded that “[u]nder our equal
protection jurisprudence, however, plaintiffs' claimed right to the name of marriage is surely not the same now that
equal rights and benefits must be conferred on committed same-sex couples.” Id.
72
MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 4 (1990).
73
Id. at 6.
74
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counterparts. Therefore, it is constructive to survey the inroads, setbacks, and standstills that
marriage equality advocates have experienced since the Commission’s final report concluded
that the Civil Union Act is a failure. In doing so, it is important to note how democratically
elected actors are influenced by the political realities regarding such a divisive and highly
debated issue in order to understand not only why the Lewis majority erred in deferring a
constitutional question to these actors, but also why it was such a critical error.
C. The Fight Continues: The Quagmire in the Wake of Lewis v. Harris
In the wake of Lewis v. Harris76 and the Commission’s report signaling the inadequacy of
the Civil Union Act,77 marriage equality advocates and many public officials have responded
with increased purpose to finally achieve marriage equality.78 As the campaign for marriage
equality continues in both the New Jersey Statehouse and in the courts, it becomes increasingly
clear just how significant a miscalculation it was for the Lewis majority to defer to the legislature
on an issue so important and contentious as the rights of a minority group. By failing to properly
address the rights of same-sex couples in Lewis v. Harris and instead leaving the issue for the
political playground that is Trenton, New Jersey, the New Jersey Supreme Court renounced its
role as ultimate adjudicator of the New Jersey Constitution. The fight towards full marriage
equality in New Jersey since the Civil Union Commission’s proclamation that the Civil Union
Act has failed to provide equality highlights how politics can stand as a barrier to justice where a
court relinquishes its “constitutional duty to redress violations of constitutional rights.”79
Moreover, as demonstrated by the current state of affairs in New Jersey, the Lewis decision has
led to a political quagmire in which same-sex couples have been left without a proper remedy.
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1. Legislative Efforts to Achieve Marriage Equality
According to polling data, a majority of New Jerseyans support the legalization of samesex marriage and popular support for same sex marriage has steadily increased.80 In fact, an
April 2013 poll showed that support for same-sex marriage is at an all-time high in the state, with
sixty-two percent of voters in support of marriage equality. 81 Given the trend towards accepting
marriage equality82 and the Civil Union Commission’s conclusion that the Civil Union Act has
fell short of providing equality to same-sex couples, one might think that the next logical step
would be toward full marriage equality in New Jersey. Nevertheless, though their status has not
backtracked, the future of the rights of same-sex couples in the state is entirely uncertain.
Although same-sex couples could achieve marriage equality via a legislative override, public
referendum, or pending litigation, a direct path to marriage equality is anything but certain.
a. Marriage Equality in the Legislature
One avenue through which advocates have sought to achieve marriage equality is the
legislative process, yet supporters in the New Jersey Legislature have struggled to achieve
passage of a true marriage equality bill. In January 2010, during the last days of the legislature’s
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lame duck session and prior to then-Governor Corzine’s departure, the New Jersey Senate voted
on but failed to pass a marriage equality law; the bill never made it to the General Assembly for
a full vote.83 In February 2012, the next legislative session, the legislature finally passed samesex marriage, making New Jersey the third state in the nation to pass a marriage equality bill
under a governor opposed to marriage equality. Nevertheless, as he had vowed to do in January
2012 if the measure passed,84 Governor Chris Christie swiftly vetoed the bill.85
The bill, though vetoed, is not yet dead, a fact that has marriage equality advocates
hopeful. The New Jersey Legislature has until January 2014 to find the two-thirds supermajority
needed to override the veto, a move that would require more support from Republican
lawmakers.86 In the Senate, the bill originally passed by a vote of twenty-four to sixteen. Only
three more votes are needed to reach a supermajority. An override in the General Assembly is a
higher hurdle. The original vote in the Assembly was forty-two to thirty-three; therefore, twelve
more affirmative votes are necessary.87 In early February 2013, legislators in both the Assembly
and Senate chambers announced plans to seek to override the veto.88 The fact that Washington
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D.C. and nine states,89 including New York and Connecticut, have legalized same-sex marriage
may be part of the rationale for the newfound sense of support for an override.90 Still, this effort
will be met with opposition.
There are significant political implications of a campaign to override Christie’s veto. The
New Jersey Family Policy Council, a politically active groups whose mission is to stop what its
supporters believe to be the breakdown of the traditional family and family values, is committed
to mobilizing its members and dollars against an override effort and believes the fight to override
will die in the Assembly.91 Because of potential political implications of voting for the override,
any vote will likely occur only after the upcoming June 2013 primary election.92 In order to
succeed in this new override push, a number of Republican legislators would have to vote for the
measure and against the powerful and popular Governor Christie.93 There are Republicans who
may vote for the measure, and holding the vote after the June primary would relieve sympathetic
Republicans from having to go on record in favor of same-sex marriage before the primary
season in which they may be facing more conservative primary challengers. 94 Interestingly,
Steven Goldstein, former Chair of Garden State Equality, New Jersey’s largest civil rights
advocacy organization, which focuses on LGBT rights, has noted that political realities play a
significant role in the fight for marriage equality. Goldstein noted that, if Governor Christie
considers a run for the presidency in 2016, his stance on same-sex marriage could change given
that “national polling indicates that voters will continue to become more supportive of marriage
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equality, making the issue a political winner for a Republican, at least in a general election.”95
As demonstrated, advocates will have to strategize and traverse the extremely precarious
political thicket if they are to succeed in the legislature.
b. Marriage Equality via a Public Referendum
In addition to a possible legislative override, another strategy supported by some, but
certainly not all marriage equality supporters, is a public referendum to amend the New Jersey
Constitution to legalize same-sex marriage.96 In his veto message of the same-sex marriage
legislation outlining his objections and recommendations to the bill,97 Governor Christie called
for a referendum on same-sex marriage in place of legislation legalizing same-sex marriage.98
In support of his actions to veto the legislation, and instead to support a referendum to let voters
decide, Governor Christie publicly stated that: “this is not an issue that should rest solely in the
hands of the Senate, or in the hands of the Speaker [of the New Jersey General Assembly] or the
other 118 members of the Legislature. Let’s let the people of New Jersey decide what is right for
the state.”99 Moreover, Governor Christie received much criticism for stating: "The fact of the
matter is, I think people would have been happy to have a referendum on civil rights rather than
fighting and dying in the streets in the South."100 Other public officials, led by the Governor,
have called for a public vote via referendum as a means to defeat the proposal even though the
legislature was posed to pass it.
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Currently pending before the New Jersey Legislature is SCR-88, a concurrent
resolution101 that, if passed by a majority of New Jersey voters after passing both chambers of
the legislature, would amend the state constitution to define “marriage” as the “the legally
recognized union of two persons of any gender.”102 Many have expressed that the rights of
same-sex couples should not be left to a majority of voters because such a move would be
tantamount to a tyranny of the majority; eliminating the safeguards built into representative
government poses a special threat to disfavored minority groups.103 Columnist Patrick Murray
warns that the referendum process leaves pressing policy issues to the public, which “lacks both
access to information and the ability to deliberate . . . which our founders specifically said should
be left to an informed, deliberative system of representative government,” concluding that “you
don’t put civil rights to a public vote.”104
There are widely varying views among proponents as to whether to proceed with the
referendum. The current state of the fight for marriage equality poses particular political hurdles.
101

The New Jersey State Constitution can be amended by concurrent resolution. A resolution to amend may
originate in either house. The proposal must sit on the desk of each member of both houses at least twenty-one days
prior to a vote in the house of origination and a public hearing on the measure must also take place before a vote. In
order to then be presented to the people on the ballot, three-fifths the members of each house must vote in the
proposal’s favor. If the measure fails to receive a three-fifth approval, but receives a majority of votes, the measure
can be referred to the legislature in the next legislative year. The measure would then only require a majority vote to
be presented to the people. If a majority of voters vote in favor of the proposal, the amendment will become part of
the constitution on the thirtieth day after the election. NJ CONST. art. IX, ¶¶ 1–7; Assemb. Rule 21:1 (specifying that
a constitutional amendment presented to the people must be via a concurrent resolution and other parliamentary
requirements); Senate Rule 24, 25 (same).
102
SCR-88, 215th Sen. (N.J. 2012). A concurrent resolution is the constitutionally prescribed mechanism for
placing public questions on the ballot at a general election. Unlike in other states, many of which have a mechanism
for voter-initiated referenda, any referendum in New Jersey would first need to be passed by the legislature before it
could be placed on the ballot. See supra note 101. Given the opposition to a referendum from Democratic
legislators and the fact that the Democrats control both the General Assembly and the Senate, the prospect of a
referendum appears unlikely. Bolcer, supra note 86.
103
See, e.g., Lauren E. Repole, Comment, Direct Tyranny: The Human Rights Act as a Safeguard Against Harmful
Majoritarianism in Jackson v. District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 685
(2013) (discussing the concerns associated with putting civil rights issues on the ballot). In a noteworthy dissent in
Strauss v. Horton, a California Supreme Court case regarding the constitutionality of Proposition 8, Justice Moreno
expressed concerns about allowing a majority of voters to dictate the rights of insular minorities, reasoning that “the
will of the majority be tempered by justice.” Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 130 (Cal. 2009) (Moreno, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
104
Murray, supra note 98.

22

Repole

Governor Christie strongly opposes same-sex marriage, but has indicated he would accept the
results of any public referendum on the topic.105 A majority of the legislature, but not yet a vetoproof majority, supports same-sex marriage, but not a public referendum to amend the New
Jersey Constitution to allow for same-sex marriage, in part because of the concerns of leaving
such an issue to a majority vote.106 For instance, the Senate President, Stephen Sweeney, has
publically announced that civil rights should not be put on a ballot for a majority vote. 107
Senator Ray Lesniak, a long-time state senator and Democratic supporter of same-sex marriage
legislation, is quoted as predicting that a referendum could be a “last resort” if the legislative
override fails, Garden State Equality v. Dow,108 currently pending in New Jersey Superior Court,
proves unsuccessful in achieving marriage equality, and “Christie remains in office with his
present attitude.”109 Meanwhile, Assemblyman Reed Gusciora, New Jersey’s first openly gay
legislator and a Democratic Assemblyman who has long championed marriage equality, publicly
supports a referendum. Assemblyman Gusciora has introduced a bill that would allow voters to
approve marriage equality via the ballot and supports a measure being placed on the ballot in the
November 2013 election.110
The possibility of a referendum to achieve marriage equality has divided advocates as well
as public officials. The referendum does pose advantages: it would allow voters and same-sex
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marriage proponents to bypass the political standoff between executive and the legislative
branches in order to force action and to succeed in achieving marriage equality. Even in light of
the success of marriage equality referenda in Maine, Maryland, and Washington in the
November 2012 general election, lawmakers and advocates in New Jersey still object to the
concept of putting civil rights to a popular vote.111 In addition to the problem of putting civil
rights issues to a popular vote, the acrimony that a public debate about such an issue would spark
and the potentially harmful implications it would have on the LGBT community are important
considerations.

Studies have shown that state same-sex marriage referenda have negative

impacts on the on the LGTB community living in that state, “even if they do not participate at all
in advocacy.”112 Such effects include “heightened stress—both for LGBT individuals and their
children—divided families and communities, and extra psychological risk for those who engage
in the hostile political campaign.”113 The long-term negative consequences of losing such a
referendum also cannot be overstated.
Opponents of a referendum also note practical reasons to avoid a public referendum: how
extraordinarily expensive and potentially cost-prohibitive it would be to conduct a proper
campaign in New Jersey’s media market.114 Particularly in the light of the fact that Governor
Christie will be running for reelection and all legislative seats will be open,115 a ballot measure
during the November 2013 election could draw millions of dollars from out-of-state
conservatives who oppose same-sex marriage and who passionately view marriage as between
and man and a woman.116 When asked about the possibility of a referendum in New Jersey,
111
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Steven Goldstein, former Chair of Garden State Equality, stated that: "A referendum is . . . a
contest of which side can raise more millions. A referendum puts a community’s civil rights up
for sale to the highest bidder . . . ."117 He further asked three pointed rhetorical questions:
Would you want your civil rights to be at the mercy of the
financial infestation of our political system? Aren’t we sick of the
Super PAC lies that slice our society with hate? Can you imagine
the exponential hate – and cost – that would infest a marriage
equality referendum in hardball New Jersey? 118
No bill that would allow for a public referendum in November 2013 has received any
traction to date in the New Jersey Legislature. Given the many concerns voiced by marriage
equality advocates, it does not yet seem to be the next likely course of action in the fight for
marriage equality.
2. Back in the Courtroom to Seek Full Marriage Equality
While the fate of marriage equality in the legislature and at the ballot box is uncertain,
advocates continue a multi-pronged approach by also pursuing further litigation in the courts in
the light of the failures of the Civil Union Act to remedy the plight of same-sex couples. On
March 18, 2010, the Lewis plaintiffs filed a motion with the New Jersey Supreme Court in aid of
litigants’ rights,119 which challenged the inadequacy of the Civil Union Act to fulfill the mandate
set forth in Lewis.120 In consideration of the shortcomings of the Civil Union Act, this petition
117
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asked the court to compel the New Jersey Legislature to grant civil marriage to same-sex
couples. In response to the motion, on July 26, 2010, the court denied plaintiffs’ motion to
enforce litigants’ rights, without prejudice.121 In so ruling, the court articulated that the proper
venue for the action was in the Superior Court.122
Following the directive of the New Jersey Supreme Court, on June 29, 2011, plaintiffs
filed a four-count complaint in the Superior Court, Law Division, Mercer County. The plaintiffs
filed both state and federal law claims, including that the Civil Union Act violates both the New
Jersey Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.123 The
plaintiffs include Garden State Equality as lead plaintiff, and seven same-sex couples, all
represented by Lambda Legal. The defendants, like those in Lewis, are named in their official
capacities based on their respective roles in implementing and enforcing state law.124
The specific complaints include: a denial of equal protection under Article I, Paragraph 1
of the New Jersey Constitution; a denial of the fundamental right to marry under Article I,
Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution; a denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983; and a the denial
of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in
violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983.125 The defendants moved for the court to dismiss the complaint
for failure to state a claim. The court denied the motion to dismiss as to the count that same-sex
couples were denied equal protection under Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey
Constitution, and granted the motion with respect to the other three claims. Soon thereafter, the
plaintiffs moved for the court to reconsider the dismissal of the third claim, that the Civil Union
121
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Act denies same-sex of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983.126
In an unpublished opinion addressing defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint, Judge
Feinberg of the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division granted the motion for
reconsideration. As a consequence, the case will proceed to trial on the equal protection claims
under the Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution.127

In her analysis, Judge Feinberg noted that Baker v.

Nelson128 was no longer controlling precedent. In Baker, the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal
of a Minnesota Supreme Court judgment holding that a state law defining marriage to be
between only “persons of the opposite sex” for lack of a federal question under both the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution.129 Baker, Judge Feinberg reasoned,
“was decided forty years ago and both doctrinal and societal developments since Baker indicate
that it has sustained serious erosion.”130
In coming to the conclusion that Baker is no longer controlling, the judge surveyed the
changing federal legal landscape in regard to sexual orientation as a protected class.131 In this
regard, Judge Feinberg noted that Baker has been undermined by subsequent Supreme Court
precedent, such as Romer v. Evans132 and Lawrence v. Texas.133 Judge Feinberg also noted that
“the denial of the title of marriage to same-sex couples’ relationships has been likened by courts
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and scholars to other forms of discrimination once considered to be appropriate,” such as
miscegenation laws or discrimination based on sex.134
Moreover, Judge Feinberg observed that the recent Ninth Circuit case, Perry v. Brown,135
in which the Ninth Circuit affirmed a lower decision finding that Proposition 8, a voter-enacted
constitutional amendment California limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples, violated the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Equal Protection Clause because the amendment singled out
certain citizens for unfavorable treatment.136 Judge Feinberg reasoned that, although the Civil
Union Act, unlike Proposition 8, “was intended to confer more benefits on same-sex couples,” . .
. . the Civil Union act is arguably similar because it singles out a certain class of citizens, namely
gays and lesbians, for allegedly disfavored treatment.”137 Judge Feinberg therefore concluded
that, while the Civil Union Act does bestow certain benefits on same-sex couples, it also denies
these couples the designation of marriage and “allegedly does not bestow upon plaintiffs all of
the benefits enjoyed” by opposite-sex couples.138 The court was satisfied that there is sufficient
state action to permit the claim under the Federal Equal Protection Clause to proceed. 139 This
case is still pending. As will be discussed below, this case provides an opportunity to learn from
the Lewis decision and to finally grant marriage equality to same-sex couples in New Jersey.

III. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AS A BASIS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE 2006 LEWIS V. HARRIS
DECISION
Given the failings of the Civil Union Act and the current disorder surrounding the fight for
134
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marriage equality, it is helpful to understand the majority’s analysis in Lewis under a state
constitutional law framework. States constitutions are profoundly different from the United
States Constitution in their origin, function, form, and quality and therefore must be understood,
evaluated, and utilized on their own terms.140

In this regard, state constitutional scholar Robert

F. Williams summarizes the primary characteristics upon which state constitutions differ from
the federal model, including: their length, which is in part due to the states’ broader range of
plenary authority; their inclusion of policy matters that could be treated by legislation; and the
state constitutions’ relative ease of revision and amendment.141 It is the final distinguishing
factor that will be the primary basis of this theoretical discussion.
Relatively speaking, a state constitution is much easier to amend than the federal
Constitution.142 Therefore, as Professor Williams concludes, it is easier to “correct an error”
made by a state court interpreting a state constitution.143 Williams identifies two paramount
reasons why state constitutions are more easily penetrable by democratic majorities: the process
of selection of state supreme court justices and the methods of adopting and/or modifying
constitutions to achieve social change.144 States currently employ various methods for selecting
140
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state supreme court justices, such as partisan election, nonpartisan election, election by
legislature, gubernatorial appointment, as is the process in New Jersey, and merit selection.145
Selection by popular vote certainly raises concerns about the independence of the judiciary. Yet,
for purposes of the present discussion, this first point is of little relevance, as New Jersey’s
judiciary are appointed and confirmed by the Senate and, in contrast to many states’ judiciaries,
are not elected.146
As to the second point, that state constitutions are more easily modified, New Jersey does
have methods through which democratic majorities can modify the constitution. In regard to the
penetrability of state constitutions, one reason for this is the use of direct democratic methods to
amend state constitutions. Direct democracy is “the process by which voters directly decide
issues of public policy by voting on ballot propositions.”147 While a number of states have some
form of direct public lawmaking method, be it the initiative, referendum, or recall,148 these
mechanisms of popular voter participation in governing and constitution-making have never
been adopted in the federal constitutional model.149 There are generally two subgroups of direct
democratic methods: substitutive and complementary.150 Substitutive direct democracy allows
the public to bypass the government completely, thereby substituting popular lawmaking for the
representative process.151

The initiative, the most common form of substitutive direct

democracy, allows citizens to propose legislative measures or constitutional amendments to be
placed on a ballot for a popular vote.152
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Conversely, complementary democracy does not allow voters to entirely bypass the
government. The referendum is the most common form of complementary democracy and
“refers a proposed or existing law or statute to voters for their approval or rejection.” 153 In this
scenario, the electorate and legislature act jointly in order to ratify a measure.154 The recall is a
procedure by which the electorate can remove a public official by submitting a petition required
to allow the entire electorate to vote on the tenure of the public official.155 New Jersey’s
Constitution allows for a form of popular referendum, whereby the legislature first enacts a
measure and then poses it to the electorate to vote on before the measure can go into effect.156
The electorate cannot directly propose a constitutional amendment in the state.
In light of these differences between the federal Constitution and state constitutions,
constitutional scholars have theorized about how the approaches of the state and the Supreme
Court of the United States vary with respect to constitutional interpretation given the potential
influence of non-judicial actors in the state model. In 1999, Professor Douglas Reed coined the
term “popular constitutionalism” to describe his theory that the "processes of generating state
constitutional meanings . . . are subject to much more intense political disputation by interests
and coalitions of interests than is the Federal Constitution."157 Constitutional scholar Mark
Tushnet describes the premise of popular constitutionalism as a dialogue—constitutional law as a
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conversation between the people, legislatures, executives, and courts.158 Under this view, it is
the interaction and conversations between non-judicial and judicial actors that produce
constitutional law.159 According to Professor Tushnet, what is most noteworthy about popular
constitutionalism is that the courts “have no normative priority in the conversation.”160
Popular constitutionalism stems from the understanding, as expressed by Professor
Williams, that state constitutional questions should not be approached in the same manner as the
federal Constitution. One difference posed by Professor Reed is that state constitutionalism is
subject to far more intense political debate by special interest coalitions than its federal
counterpart, whereby non-judicial actors who vie strategically against one another to advance
their understandings of state constitutional meanings play an integral role.161 The role of nonjudicial actors, Reed posits, is justified by the fact that state constitutions give great credence and
power to democratic majorities, which in turn invites and encourages contestation and dispute. 162
To that end, according to Professor Reed, state constitutional law is often sustained and
developed by the political activities of interest groups and social movements to a much greater
degree than by judicial actors.163 Therefore, state constitutional meaning is derived from the
interplay between judicial interpretation and extra-judicial mechanisms, such as popular
mobilization. Accordingly, under this theory, state constitutional law is not defined by the courts
alone and is more readily influenced by political processes and public mobilization.164
In particular, Professor Reed has noted that legal mobilization, through public interest
litigation, and voter mobilization, through ballot initiatives, have diminished the judge’s role in
158
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determining the meaning of state constitutional provisions as they relate to gay rights and samesex marriage.165 He argues that this phenomenon shows that state judicial determinations of
controversial state constitutional rights questions are rarely final and that the court of public
opinion will likely prevail, even where the political implications are messy and
confrontational.166

Reed argues that the judiciary’s awareness of the potential for popular

mobilization of non-judicial actors influences judicial deliberations and decision-making. In
addressing the Vermont Supreme Court decision of Baker v. State,167 Professor Reed noted that
the Vermont Supreme Court was aware that a decision mandating same-sex marriage “outright
might face intense opposition.”168 This court explicitly noted that “judicial authority is not
ultimate authority.”169 According to Professor Reed, this, “in a nutshell, is the lesson of popular
constitutionalism.”170
Furthermore, Professor Reed argues against the longstanding presumption of judicial
supremacy in determining the law, arguing that non-judicial actors may properly be a part of the
process. Indeed, Professor Reed even takes issue with Chief Justice John Marshall’s edict from
Marbury v. Madison,171 at least as it applies to state constitutionalism. Chief Justice Marshall
reasoned in Marbury: “It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls
any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the constitution by an
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ordinary act.”172

In the famous words of Chief Justice Marshall, “[it] is emphatically the

province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” 173 Professor Reed objects
to the dichotomous nature of Marshall’s constitutional theory, taking issue with the notion that
there is no middle ground between the constitution being superior and unchanged by ordinary
means and the constitution merely being on the level of ordinary legislative acts.174
Critical to the popular constitutionalism analysis is the importance of politics to the
constitutional process.

Former Chief Justice of the Vermont Supreme Court Jeffrey L.

Amestoy,175 in considering Professor Reed’s theory of popular constitutionalism, describes his
own state constitutional law approach as “pragmatic constitutionalism.”176 Amestoy notes that
constitutional interpretation is not exclusively reserved for judges under the popular
constitutionalism paradigm.177

As Amestoy asserted with regard to state constitutional

interpretation, “law and politics matter. The inter-relationship of ‘politics’ (and by ‘politics’ I
mean the recognition that the state constitutional framework empowers a citizenry to alter state
constitutions by much more direct political activism than is possible in the federal context) and
"law" is more subtle than is generally recognized.”178
Proponents of popular constitutionalism contend that the court should not necessarily
abrogate its role as a counter-majoritarian institution, but should be cognizant of non-judicial
actors in crafting state constitutional law.179 If the court is not the only player in defining state
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constitutional law, the primary role of the court becomes persuasiveness.180 Justices can serve as
supervisors of the process who offer guidance to the legislature through statements of principle,
but allow for the non-judicial actors to formulate a solution.181
Although Reed’s popular constitutionalism is based on the premise that state
constitutionalism differs from federal constitutionalism because state constitutions are generally
more amendable to democratic process, scholars have also applied popular constitutionalism
tenets to federal constitutional theory. This scholarship, though focusing on federal law, is
nonetheless instructive in placing the Lewis majority’s pragmatic approach in perspective. For
instance, popular constitutionalism reflects at a state level the theory that Professor Sunstein
refers to as “decisional minimalism,”182 whereby a court decides “as little as necessary to justify
an outcome.”183

Professor Sunstein proposes that courts should avoid certain important

decisions in order to ensure they are decided by democratically accountable actors. 184 Therefore,
under the minimalist paradigm, the court is justified in leaving open “the most fundamental and
constitutional questions” in order to promote democratic accountability and deliberation.185
Professor Sunstein further maintains that minimalism is most important when a court is
faced with an issue that is particularly divisive or hotly debated in the public sphere.186 Like
Professor Reed’s approach to state constitutionalism, Professor Sunstein advocates for a
pragmatic, cautious approach because of the potential for a backlash to an unpopular decision
given the contentious nature of the same-sex marriage issue. Most critically, Professor Sunstein
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advocates for judicial prudence before asserting “even a correct principle against a democratic
process that is not ready for it.”187 Professor Sunstein goes so far as to recommend that the Court
should stay away from the issue of same-sex marriage, “whatever it may be thinking about the
merits of the underlying constitutional claims.”188 Similarly, state constitutional scholar and
theorist Professor Reed argues that the resolution of contentious issues, such as gay rights and
same-sex marriage, through popular constitutionalism may provide greater legitimacy to the
eventual victories that advocates will achieve.189 Minimalism, according to Professor Sunstein,
is advantageous because it allows for greater involvement and input from other branches of
government by allowing “the democratic process room to adapt . . . .” and maneuver.190 Though
such an untidy, deferential, and indefinite adjudication may not sit well with some, Professor
Sunstein justifies such untidiness as necessary when a democracy is in moral flux, because courts
may not have the best or the final answers.191 Courts ought, to and are justified by, proceeding in
a manner that recognizes that the judiciary is but one participant in the system of democratic
deliberation.192
Moreover, Professor Eskridge has offered that judicial deference can also increase
tolerance in the long run while mediating social clashes in the short run.193 Under what he refers
to as the “jurisprudence of tolerance,” Professor Eskridge proposes that the judiciary should be
cautious when traversing certain legal issues and should adopt more conservative judicial
strategies for dealing with cultural clashes by operating “to lower the stakes of identity politics
187
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and culture clashes. The Court's moderating role is especially important when warring identity
groups threaten to radicalize politics.”194 In short, he proposes that there are long-term benefits
to deference. Popular constitutionalism, at the state level, appears to reflect these various, yet
fundamentally similar scholarly theories.
The practice of judicial deference is not merely a theory. As Professor Schapiro noted,
state court deference to state legislatures continues to be strong.195 Similarly, Professor Suzanne
Goldberg has noted that, when views about social groups, such as gays and lesbians, are in flux,
courts considering equal protection and due process claims “go to great lengths to avoid
acknowledging their central role in substantiating either the ‘old’ or ‘new’ norm.”196 Professor
Goldberg likewise concludes that the courts are “inescapably involved in absorbing, evaluating,
and influencing” popular judgments regarding certain social groups, yet seek to obfuscate their
judicial role, particularly in regard to the rights of a social group about whom social judgments
are in flux.197
This state constitutional interpretation theoretical foundation is important to keep in mind
in turning back to the decision of Lewis v. Harris. Although state constitutionalism may be
distinct in that the process by which the state constitution is created, revised, and amended
allows for greater interplay between democratic majorities, it does not necessarily follow that the
process of interpretation requires an indeterminate process open to non-judicial actors. The New
Jersey Supreme Court’s hesitation may have been a pragmatic strategy to avoid having to declare
194
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a potentially unpopular constitutional principle, even a correct principle, “against a democratic
process that [was] not ready for it.”198 The New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision has led to an
unproductive stalemate.199
IV. LEWIS V. HARRIS: A FAILED POPULAR DIALOGUE
Understanding the Lewis decision in light of the popular constitutionalism paradigm is
constructive. Such an analysis illustrates the consequences of a judiciary deferring to nonjudicial actors when defining constitutional rights, particularly where the right in question
involves a minority interest. To do so, it is helpful to also consider the analyses employed in the
Baker v. State decision, which the Lewis Court’s strategy largely mirrored.200 The majority in
Lewis, in “remanding”201 to the New Jersey Legislature, was clearly conscious of the divisive
nature of the issue of same-sex marriage. As the majority noted, there was and still is a
“nationwide public debate raging over whether same-sex marriage should be authorized under
the laws or constitutions of the various states.”202 There is little doubt that the court’s awareness
of the potential push-back of an unpopular decision played a role in the majority’s analysis.203
Ultimately, Lewis was wrongly decided. For marriage equality advocates to succeed in their
fight in the New Jersey courts, the state courts must take a constitutional purism approach, as
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advocated by Chief Justice Poritz in Lewis.204 What has occurred in the state since the Lewis
decision is perhaps precisely what Professor Tushnet described as a dialogue,205 but a failed
dialogue.
A. Popular Constitutionalism and Lewis v. Harris
Vermont Supreme Court Justice Denise Johnson dissented in Baker v. State on grounds
similar to those of Chief Justice Poritz in Lewis. Justice Johnson concluded that the Vermont
Supreme Court’s act of “remanding” to the legislature “abdicates [the] Court’s constitutional
duty to redress violations of constitutional rights.”206 Analyzing the Vermont Supreme Court
Baker decision, Professor Williams noted that, in deferring to the legislature to craft a remedy,
the Vermont court was influenced by other states, such as Hawaii, where a state constitutional
amendment following the unpopular opinion of the Hawaii Supreme Court207 overturned the
court’s holding.208 Chief Justice Amestoy explicitly acknowledged these events as instructive
when he criticized Justice Johnson’s dissent as being “significantly insulated from reality.”209
Further, as Professor Williams noted, Chief Justice Amestoy “acknowledged the fact that state
constitutions present somewhat of a paradox when guaranteeing rights, because judicial rights
interpretation can be overturned by a mere majority vote through state constitutional
amendment” in many states.210
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Perhaps keeping in mind the principles of popular constitutionalism, as the Baker Court
ostensibly did, the Lewis majority noted that determining whether a particular right is so critical
to the concept of ordered liberty to be ranked fundamental requires “both caution and
foresight.”211 There is no doubt that not all rights are fundamental within the due process
analysis. As the New Jersey Supreme Court noted, the United States Supreme Court has warned
against a “liberty protected by the Due Process Clause” being “subtly transformed into the policy
preferences of the Members of [the] Court.”212 Again in a cautious manner, the Lewis majority
warned against imposing the court’s “personal value system on eight-and-one-half million
people” under the guise of newly found rights effectively bypasses “the democratic process as
the primary means of effecting social change in this State.”213 While recognizing that the court
need not look beyond state borders for the source of rights defined under the New Jersey
Constitution, the court, perhaps looking for further justification for its decision, still noted that
that no jurisdiction, not even Massachusetts, has declared that there is a fundamental right to
same-sex marriage under either the federal constitution or its own.”214
What is perplexing about the Lewis decision is the court’s juxtaposition of the importance
of judicial independence in limiting the power of government to oppress minorities and, at the
same time, the need to defer to the legislative branch of government. The court recognizes its
responsibility “to decide constitutional questions, no matter how difficult,” yet notes that
211
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deference to the legislature is a cardinal principle of “our law.”215 The majority went so far as to
conclude that the “constitutional relief that we give to plaintiffs cannot be effectuated
immediately or by this Court alone.”216 While denouncing any suggestion that the court was
trying to influence the legislature, it announced that it would not only leave it to the legislature to
come up with the appropriate remedy, but that, whatever course of action the legislature takes,
the court’s starting point “must be to presume the constitutionality of legislation.”217
Harkening to the lessons of Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 78, the majority
discussed the independent judiciary’s role as the bulwark of the Constitution against legislative
encroachment because the judiciary is the only branch of government capable of protecting
oppressed minorities against the power of the democratically elected branches of government.218
Therefore, it is clear that the majority was aware of its responsibility as a countermajoritarian
institution to protect insular minorities.219 Significantly, Justice Albin left open the possibility
that the parallel structure created by the legislature could violate the rights of same-sex couples,
but that “[a] proper respect for a coordinate branch of government counsels that [the court] defer
until it has spoken.”220 To hold otherwise would “short-circuit the democratic process from
running its course.”221 The court did not, however, discuss how to determine when exactly the
democratic process has run its course.
B. Lessons from Lewis and the Future of Marriage Equality in New Jersey
The court’s responsibility is constitutional adjudication, but that should not suggest that
the court must “steer clear of the swift and treacherous currents of social policy” where the court
215
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is navigating uncharted constitutional territory.222

Yet, the majority in Lewis adopted a

pragmatic approach, reasoning that, “profound change in the public consciousness . . . must
come about through civil dialogue and reasoned discourse, and the considered judgment of the
people in whom we place ultimate trust in our republican form of government.”223

The

majority’s concern for letting the democratic process “run its course”224 eclipsed the court’s
responsibility to adjudicate constitutional issues.

As previously discussed,225 a premise of

popular constitutionalism is that the court should “defer” to non-judicial actors in regard to
highly contested issues so that when change does occur, the public is more willing to accept it.
Polls in New Jersey suggest that a clear majority of New Jerseyans support the legalization of
same-sex marriage.226 Yet, as detailed above,227 the status of same-sex marriage has not changed
since Lewis and the future of legalization, left to the devices of democratic majorities, is
uncertain.
Although the majority in Lewis took a pragmatic approach to constitutional interpretation,
ultimately the decision was wrongly decided because equality is a matter of constitutional
interpretation, not merely a matter of public policy.228 The court should have followed Chief
Justice Poritz’s approach and affirmatively decided the due process and the label of marriage
issues regardless of concerns about the after-effects of an unpopular decision. As Chief Justice
Poritz reasoned, the plaintiff’s interests in Lewis arose out of constitutional principles integral to
the operation of liberty of a free people.229 While there may be no way to separate the law from
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politics in the practice of constitutional law and interpretation,230 the court should not freely
abdicate its responsibilities as an independent branch of government.231
Simply because other non-judicial actors ostensibly play a larger role in defining the law
of the state,232 this should not necessarily be a justification for the courts to defer to these actors,
particularly on fundamental right and equal protection matters.

It more reasonably follows that

the constitution’s penetrability should be cause for vigilance, not acquiescence. There certainly
may be some middle ground between an impenetrable constitution and one that is no different
than ordinary legislation.233 Nevertheless, though increased activity on behalf of the other
branches increases total involvement, the process of organized liberty should not be seen as a
zero-sum experiment.

For instance, Professor Schapiro suggests that the judiciary can

“coordinate” with the other branches in interpreting the constitution without deferring to the
other branches of government.234

Professor Shapiro further reasons that “the case for

independent executive and legislative interpretation builds on the case for independent judicial
interpretation.”235 Coordinate action among the branches “merely recognizes the voices” of the
other branches of government, “it does not silence the Judiciary.”236
A constitutionally defined right is a right no matter how the public may respond to a
judicial opinion recognizing such a right. In perhaps the most important footnote written in an
opinion, the Supreme Court reasoned that it should act to improve the democratic character of
government by protecting those groups that are especially at risk because democracy, thus far,
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has failed to be democratic enough to include them.237 Federalist No. 78, though of course
referring to the structure of the federal judiciary, is nonetheless noteworthy here. Although the
judiciary has neither the power of the purse nor the sword, its power lies in its completely
independent judgment.238
Most troubling about a pragmatic, deferential state constitutionalism approach under the
popular constitutionalism paradigm is the proposition that court practice prudence in asserting a
correct principle against a democratic process that is not ready for it. 239 Justice Amestoy’s
proposition, that the court’s role in defining constitutional law is persuading non-judicial actors
by offering guidance but avoiding formulating a solution,240 falls short of encapsulating the role
of the court: to provide a solution, a remedy. At times, the right decision is not popular, but it
does not make it less right under the law. Although democratic majorities may have an easier
time penetrating, revising, and amending a state constitution rather than the federal Constitution,
it does not necessarily follow that the court should abdicate any of its responsibility to interpret
that constitution as it now stands. Politics cannot matter more than law if the judicial branch
functions as designed.241 The question of access to civil marriage by same-sex couples “is not a
matter of social policy but of constitutional interpretation.”242 It is a question for the court to
decide.
V. CONCLUSION
Whether categorized as popular constitutionalism,243 pragmatic constitutionalism,244 or
deferential minimalism245 the concept that an independent judiciary should head to the popular
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will is troubling because it is antithetical to the premise of American government. As the
architect of the United States Constitution, James Madison, warned, “If men were angels, no
government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal
controls on government would be necessary.”246 Although state constitutions may vary from
their federal counterpart in that they are more easily modified, state courts should not forgo the
lessons of the founders regarding the rights of disfavored minorities. Rooted in the pragmatic,
strategic approach to constitutional interpretation is the proposition that certain decisions, even
though perhaps ultimately “right,” are not yet ready to be decided.247 This concern regarding the
price of potential error and the cost of an unpopular decision can and will lead to fundamental
unfairness.248
The ultimate misstep in emphasizing an overly pragmatic, minimalist approach to
constitutional interpretation, particularly when the rights of insular minorities are at issue, is that
the independent judiciary, who is charged with protecting these individuals from governmental
intervention, is displaced with the democratic processes of non-judicial actors who may seek to
attack these same rights. This proposition is not to suggest that there is no place for democratic
processes in policy setting. Such a suggestion is utterly baseless in the American and New
Jersey experience. What this paper hopes to suggest is that the presence and power of these nonjudicial actors should be reason for the court to hold tight to its responsibilities, not to yield
them. It is not a question of judicial supremacy, but of judicial independence. Lewis v. Harris
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may have led to cacophonous conversation between the people, legislatures, executives, and
courts,249 but it has been a failed dialogue.
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